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Samuel Winship, a twelve-year-old juvenile, allegedly entered a
locker and stole $;112 from a woman's pocketbook. The Family Court,
Bronx County, requiring only a preponderance of the evidence in
accordance with the statute,1 adjudged him a delinquent and ordered
2
his confinement in a training school for a period of up to six years.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the
adjudication without opinion. 8 In his argument before the New York
Court of Appeals, Winship contended that due process required that
a finding of delinquency be based upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court rejected his contention, upheld the adjudication,
and expressly ruled the statute constitutional.4 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that due process requires the application
of the higher standard of proof-proof beyond a reasonable doubtduring adjudicatory proceedings "when a juvenile is charged with an
act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult."'
The dawn of this century saw the widespread establishment of
juvenile courts imbued with the philosophy of rehabilitation, rather
than punishment, of juvenile offenders. 7 The new concept charged the
state with responsibility as parens patriae in aiding children through
the informal juvenile court proceeding." The object was to provide
delinquent youths with guidance and training, while avoiding "all
suggestion and taint of criminality." Procedural guidelines were often
1 N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 744(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides in part:
Any determination at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing that a
respondent did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
2 In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970).
8 In re Samuel W., 30 App. Div. 2d 781, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1968).
4 W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 247 N.E.2d 253, 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414,
420 (1969).
5 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
6 Id. at 359.
7 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAv. L. Rxv. 104, 107 (1909). See also THE
PRESIENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2-3 (1967), which found that the
rapid industrialization, immigration, and urbanization of the 19th century saw a sharp
rise in juvenile delinquency. Reformers pressed for a separate judicial system as the best
way to help these wayward youths. Illinois' Juvenile Court Act of 1899 was followed by
others, and by 1925, juvenile courts had been established in all but two states. Today,
they operate in every American jurisdiction.
8 Mack, supra note 7, at 109.
9 People v, Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 176, 183 N.E. 353, 354 (1932).
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broad and ill-defined, requiring the hearing to comply with traditional
safeguards,1 0 to be conducted with fundamental fairness," or to
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. 12 Generally, social and humanitarian considerations took precedence over
constitutionally required procedural safeguards in these courts.18
The absence of these constitutional restrictions was explained by
the "civil" nature of the proceedings, 14 since the parens patriae doctrine held that "[t]he basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to
custody."'1 5 A delinquency adjudication providing for incarceration of
the youth in a training school was merely a transfer of custody, in
which the state assumed the role of guardian.' 6 Thus, a juvenile could
suffer no loss of liberty, since he had none, and "there was neither right
to nor necessity for the procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution and statute in criminal cases." 1 7
Despite the reformers' well-intentioned efforts, dissatisfaction with
the performance of the juvenile court system grew. In 1966, the United
States Supreme Court, in Kent v. United States,'8 expressed disillusionment with the system, prompting speculation that the Court would
soon extend to juveniles many of the constitutional safeguards then
afforded adults. The Court stated:
[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. 19
Finally, the Supreme Court, through In re Gault,20 ended the juvenile
court's immunity from the reach of due process. Noting the juvenile
system's deficiencies and realistically appraising the term "delinquent"
as having "only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied
to adults,"'2 ' Gault declared: "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment
10 State v. Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 794, 64 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1954).
11 Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D.N.J. 1957).
12 State in re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 236, 225 A.2d 110, 116 (1966).
Is See generally People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); People v.
Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
14 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
15 Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719, 720 (1962).
16 See State v. Dunn, 53 Ore. 304, 309, 99 P. 278, 280 (1909).
17 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932).

18 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
19 Id. at 556.
20 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21 Id. at 23-24.
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nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 22 Gault decided that while
juvenile delinquency proceedings need not conform entirely with adult
criminal proceedings, they must apply "the essentials of due process
and fair treatment" when the child's liberty is at stake, including: the
right to counsel; 23 the privilege against self-incrimination; 24 the right
of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses; 25 and adequate notice of the hearing and of the charges. 26 In re
Winship may be seen as a logical extension of Gault, in which the
Court decided that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the
'essentials of due process and fair treatment'." 27
Before Winship, the great majority of juvenile courts applied the
standard of proof termed "by a preponderance of the evidence" or
"civil" in adjudicatory proceedings. 28 This criterion enables the judge,
sitting as the trier of fact, to decide the case in favor of the party presenting the more persuasive evidence. 29 With respect to the fact-finding
stage of juvenile hearings, the "preponderance of the evidence" required for a delinquency adjudication might have been established if
the child's delinquency appeared more probable than not.80
Criminal courts, on the other hand, have long employed the more
rigorous standard-proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Previously, several Supreme Court decisions had acknowledged that criminal prosecu1
tion warrants this higher standard.3
There is always in litigation a margin of error .... Where one

party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by
the process of placing on the other party the burden.., of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.32
Winship dealt squarely with the constitutionality of the criminal
measure:
Id. at 13.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 33-34.
397 U.S. at 359.
Id. at 360 n.3; Cohen, The Standard of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings: Gault
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 68 MicH. L. REv. 567, 569 (1970).
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29 See E.

MORGAN,

SOME

PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

SYSTEM

OF LrrIGATION 81-86 (1956).

80 See generally Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 HARv. L. REV. 59, 66-67 (1933).
81 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121
(1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
82 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
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Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.3 3
The New York Court of Appeals had maintained that its preponderance of the evidence standard was constitutional and proper in
juvenile proceedings, stating:
Careful and fully explicit safeguards ...

are provided in the

statute to insure that an adjudication of this kind is not a "conviction" . . . that it affects no right or privilege ...and a cloak of

protective confidentiality is thrown around all the proceedings ....
...There is, hence, no deprivation of due process

...

4

Winship relied heavily on Gault in justifying the extension of the
criminal standard of proof to juvenile courts. Gault observed: "[H]owever euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school'
for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is
incarcerated .

. .

."35

Paul Tappan, a sociologist, comments on the

delinquents' plight:
[A]t the child's level the experience of a delinquency adjudication
in the juvenile court, its treatment consequences, and its effects
on his reputation and his self-esteem are as severe-very often
more so-as criminal conviction is to an adult.36
This is not hard to imagine, as the staffs of many correctional institutions lack the temperament and training for their jobs,37 and facilities
are frequently overcrowded.3 8 Often, the altruistic goals of rehabilitation are forgotten as reform schools degenerate into "miniature
prisons with many of the same vicious aspects." 3 9 Juveniles undergo
the experience of forced association with more sophisticated, delinquent recidivists, or worse yet, with hardened criminals.4 0 For, in
almost one-half of the states, juvenile delinquents may be assigned to
adult penitentiaries for convicted criminals, through either "direct
83 397 U.S. at 364.
34 W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d at 200, 203, 247 N.E.2d at 255-56, 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 417-18, 420.
35 387 U.S. at 27.
36 Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REV. 547, 548 (1950).
37 Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Ats: Why Treat in a Correctional
System, 31 FED. PROB. 26, 28 (1967).
38 CHILDREN'S BUREAU,

STATISTICAL

SERIES 78, STATISTICS ON

PUBLIC

INSTITUTIONS FOR

1963 at 8-10 (1965).
39 Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 9, 11 (1968).
40 Sheridan, supra note 37, at 27-28.
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commitment" or "administrative transfer." 41 Understandably, the
juvenile's confinement can have "lasting effects upon his personality
and ability to cope in a socially acceptable way." 42 Thus, our juvenile
system often presented the paradox of a civil adjudication based on
the preponderance of the evidence standard, and a criminal deprivation of liberty. Winship acknowledged that although the "'civil'
label-of-convenience" 4 8 attaches to juvenile proceedings, replete with
promises of compassionate and benevolent treatment, "civil labels and
good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due
process safeguards in juvenile courts.. .. "44
As for the "cloak of protective confidentiality," 45 Gault had already noted that often the "claim of secrecy... is more rhetoric than
reality. 46 No statutory restrictions govern juvenile court records in
over half the states, "and presumably.., they are public records and
may be examined by anyone. '47 The stigma attaching to the rehabilitated delinquent, almost comparable to that of a convicted criminal,
may handicap his employment opportunities for years to come. 48 And
the suggestion of the New York Court of Appeals, that only a "tenuous
difference" exists between the two standards of proof, was convincingly
rebutted by the juvenile judge's admission that, while he was satisfied
by a preponderance of the evidence, he was not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant had stolen the money.4 9
The application of Winship is limited to the adjudicatory, or
41 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUBLICATION 415, DELINQUENT CHILDREN IN PENAL INsTITUTIONS
1, 2 (1964). "Incorrigible behavior" is the most frequently cited criterion for transfer to a
reformatory, penitentiary, or other facility for convicted -criminals. The determination of
incorrigibility is necessarily subjective, influenced by such factors as the institution's
philosophy, the available programs and services, and the training and skill of the staff.
"What may be deemed incorrigible by the officials in one institution may be acceptable as
symptomatic, acting-out conduct in another." Id. at 3-8. Statutory authority affords the
legal basis for transfer in most of these jurisidictions. The constitutionality of these
transfers has been questioned: Compare Shone v. State, 237 A.2d 412 (Me. 1968), rev'd on
constitutional grounds, 406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969) with In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d
266 (1966). See also Pirsig, The Constitutional Validity of Confining Disruptive Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 MINN. L. Rxv. 101 (1969).
42 Lipsitt, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the juvenile Justice
System, 49 B.U.L. REv. 62, 75 (1969).
43 In re Gault, 387 US. at 50 (1967).
44 397 U.S. at 365-66.
45 24 N.Y.2d at 200, 247 N.E.2d at 256, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
46 387 U.S. at 24.
47 Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and the
Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REv. 567, 604 (1969).
48 Sheridan, supra note 37, at 28.
49 397 US. at 369 (concurring opinion).
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fact-finding stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings, as was Gault.50
The Supreme Court maintains that the application of constitutional
safeguards is consistent with the "commendable principles relating to
the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults." 51
Thus, it appears possible that in the future, through the seemingly
expansive medium of due process, many pre-judicial and dispositional
procedural safeguards, now afforded criminally-charged adults, will be
extended to juvenile defendants as well. 52 A gradual return to traditional criminal procedures in juvenile courts, far from destroying
their benevolent character, will only serve to strengthen them. For,
as Justice Musmanno wrote in the dissent to Holmes' Appeal:58
[N]o matter how trained and experienced a Juvenile Court judge
may be, he cannot by any magical fishing rod draw forth the truth
out of a confused sea of speculation, rumor, suspicion and hearsay.
He must follow certain
procedures which the wisdom of centuries
has established." 54
Winship neither impugns the charitable philosophy of the juvenile court, nor imposes upon it burdensome and rigid technicalities.
Rather, it recognizes that a child's liberty is every bit as precious as
an adult's. Accordingly, it decides that due process demands the same
certitude of guilt-proof beyond a reasonable doubt-in both cases.
Frank T. Flannery
Id. at 358-59.
51 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22 (1967).
52 See also these matters which state courts have considered: In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d
53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968); In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Faro. Ct.
1963) (evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure will be excluded at a juvenile
hearing); Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. 1968) (statements made by a juvenile,
without his waiver of the right to remain silent, will be excluded).
53 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
54 Id. at 614, 109 A.2d at 529.
50

